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 Abstract 
Using data gathered primarily during interviews with managers and trade union 
officials, this article examines how trade unions and employers have reacted to 
the introduction of the statutory procedure for union recognition in the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 (ERA). Findings indicate that the ERA and the 
drift of EU influence have had a substantial effect in shifting the balance of 
employer attitudes towards greater approval of trade unions and have 
accelerated the rate at which employers are redesigning their relationships with 
unions. Although employers are tending to restrict unions’ influence over 
traditional issues such as pay-setting, they are increasingly seeking their 
assistance in implementing difficult organisational changes. The article explores 
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There has been upheaval in the collective representation of employees 
in Britain over the past twenty years. The system of collective 
bargaining that was once the basis for regulating employment 
relations has been transformed. The coverage of collective agreements 
has almost halved since the late 1970s, and both the range of issues 
negotiated over and the impact of trade unions have diminished 
(Brown et al, 2000). This apparent fragility of the British system of 
collective bargaining is, at least in part, attributable to the tradition of 
‘collective  laissez-faire’ - the characteristic paucity of statutory 
support for collective employment rights in British labour law (Davies 
and Freedland, 1993). However, as the 20
th century drew to a close, 
even as established collective bargaining arrangements were 
crumbling, this lack of legal support was itself subject to revision.  
 
A statutory procedure for union recognition was introduced in June 
2000 through the 1999 Employment Relations Act  (ERA).
1 Under 
this, employers could be obliged to recognise a union that can 
demonstrate a certain level of employee support. Accompanying this 
were a number of measures to bolster trade union rights at work, most 
notably that any employee who has a serious grievance or discipline 
case has, in pursuing their case, a ‘right to be accompanied’ by 
someone of their own choice who, even where unions are not 
recognized, could be a trade union official. 
 
The potentially far-reaching significance of the ERA is suggested by 
the conclusion of Bain’s classic study of white-collar trade union 
growth, that ‘…the strength of these unions will generally not be 
sufficient in itself to persuade employers to concede recognition; this 
will require the help of the government. In short, the future growth of 
white-collar unionism in Britain is largely dependent upon 
government action to encourage union recognition’ (Bain, 1970: 188). 
He was writing of an era when white-collar trade unions were more 
distinguished from other unions by their dependence upon employer 
acceptance, and he was writing of government action largely 
prompted by the exigencies of war. But by the end of the twentieth 
century this dependence had become a far more general feature of 
1  
trade unionism, and the call for government action came from the 
trade union movement itself. 
 
A central aim of the ERA was to promote voluntary recognition 
agreements, with the statutory route using the Central Arbitration 
Committee (CAC) as a last resort (Brown et al., 2001). Thus 
employers could avoid the statutory route altogether if they entered 
into a voluntary recognition agreement prior to the date when the new 
recognition law came into force in June 2001; even after this date, the 
new law provides ample opportunities for employers to forestall legal 
intervention by entering into negotiations with unions. Research into 
the early impact of the new procedures suggests that there has indeed 
been a substantial growth in voluntary agreements, largely in response 
to the new law (Gall & McKay 2000; TUC 1999, 2000, 2001; Wood 
et al 2001; ACAS, 2001). Gall & McKay (2001) concluded that, in the 
period prior to the legislation coming into force, the imminence of 
ERA had a significant impact in prompting recognition. TUC analysis 
of trends in recognition agreements also shows that the new rights 
have been a key influence over the greatly increased numbers of new 
agreements, and that employers have, as predicted, generally settled 
voluntarily in order to shape agreements and minimise conflict (TUC 
1999, 2000, 2001). As Smith & Morton (2001:133) suggest, it may be 
that the ERA has helped to “re-legitimise” trade unionism.  
 
The facilitating of trade union efforts to gain employer recognition 
was not, however, the sole objective of the new legislation. An 
additional intention, according to the preceding ‘Fairness at Work’ 
White Paper, was the promotion of workplace partnership. Funds were 
made available to facilitate partnership training within firms. When 
taken with the fact that the legislation barely changed the restrictions 
on strike activity built up over the previous twenty years, this 
suggested an intention to remodel the style of collective bargaining. 
Smith and Morton (2001:122) suggest that the object of the ERA is 
‘not to promote trade unions as autonomous workers’ organisations, 
but to remould them’ as weaker ‘partners’ in a new relationship with 
management. Wood & Godard (1999:238) had earlier concluded that  
features of the Employment Relations Bill ‘could be viewed as means 
of enhancing the chances of employers’ accepting unions as partners, 
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albeit perhaps on their own terms’. In addition, even before the British 
government’s grudging acceptance, again under union pressure, of the 
EU Draft Directive on Information and Consultation in June 2001,
2 
British labour law had been increasingly favouring consultation as a 
model for employee representation. Although not directly encouraged 
by the ERA, it is a model that contrasts with traditional notions of 
collective bargaining.  
 
There has been much speculation about the potential effects of the 
ERA on both trade unions and management practice. There have been 
predictions that the statutory recognition procedures could entrench or 
strengthen employer opposition to unions (Gall & McKay 2001, 
Towers 1999, Wood & Godard 1999). Some writers anticipate that 
problems encountered by US unions stemming from employer anti-
unionism may occur in the British context (Adams 1999, Gall & 
McKay 2001, Smith & Morton 2001, Towers 1999, Wood & Godard 
1999). They point to the growth in popularity of US non- and anti-
union management practices among British managers, and highlight 
strategies available to employers who wish to avoid recognition or to 
reduce its effects, such as gerrymandering bargaining units, or 
concluding pre-emptive agreements with malleable unions. More 
generally, Wood & Godard (1999:237) suggest that the assumption 
that collective bargaining is the best way of conducting industrial 
relations no longer runs through public policy. Millward and his 
colleagues (2000:235) predict that collective bargaining will continue 
to contract in extent and effectiveness, and that union representation 
and communication structures will continue to be replaced by 
management-controlled methods. The nature of employment 
relationships, they conclude, will become increasingly a matter for 
managerial choice.  
 
This study explores the initial impact of the legislation by means of 
interviews with employers and unions, conducted over the period 
during which the ERA was being introduced. It is concerned with the 
extent to which the legislation appears to be modifying (and in some 
ways reversing) the retreat of collective bargaining that has been  
under way in recent years, and with how far it is modifying the nature 
of collective worker representation more generally.  
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2. Research method 
 
The primary aim of the research was to assess, by means of case 
studies and interviews with trade union and employer association 
officials, initial and anticipatory responses to the ERA. It was 
conducted during 1999 and 2000 as part of the ESRC’s ‘Future of 
Work’ Programme. It developed from an earlier case study based 
analysis of ‘The Individualisation of Employment Contracts in 
Britain’ which had drawn attention to the extent to which employers, 
well before there was any prospect of the ERA, had been reducing the 
procedural involvement of trade unions in regulating the employment 
contract (Brown et al, 1998).   
 
The case studies were conducted through personal interviews, in 
selected industries, with owners, senior managers, and human 
resources (HR) staff in 60 companies and establishments characterised 
by a range of attitudes to trade unions. Drawing on the suggestions of 
trade union and industry association officials, we targeted companies 
and workplaces where changes in recognition had been made or were 
expected. To place this in a broader representative perspective, 1998 
WERS 4/5 digit industry-level data were analysed to identify sectors 
of interest in terms of recent requests for recognition, newly-
concluded recognition agreements, and derecognition. Firms were 
then selected from sectors where changes in recognition were evident. 
Around half of the employer interviews were conducted between 
January and May 1999, prior to the passage of the Employment 
Relations Act, with the remainder conducted in the latter half of 1999 
or early 2000. 
 
The cases were chosen to ensure broad coverage of sectors where 
recognition might be contentious. Near-equal numbers of production 
and service sector firms, and also of SMEs and large organisations, 
were selected. Only one wholly public sector organisation was 
included, although another nine companies had operations in the 
public sector. The companies and establishments studied were divided 
equally into those that had operations located throughout England, the  
UK, or worldwide; those located in eastern and south-eastern regions; 
and those in the midlands and northern regions. Of the case study 
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firms and establishments, 24 had recognition agreements, and 36 did 
not, although some of the latter expected that recognition was 
imminent. Managers in eight of the firms or workplaces had 
derecognised trade unions. In most cases, they had derecognised 
unions in one section or workplace and retained recognition for 
employees in others.  
 
It should be emphasised that this was not intended to be a 
representative sample of employers. Such a sample would probably 
have yielded very few firms where union recognition was a live issue. 
The intention was to identify a broad range of employers for whom 
the ERA recognition procedures might have an impact, and to explore 
the circumstances and motivations that shaped their response. A key 
aim was to ascertain the nature and determinants of individual 
employer changes in behaviour in order to shed light on how 
aggregate behaviour might develop in the longer term. The cases were 
thus selected to provide indications of types of response and not to be 
representative of responses as a whole. In this account we 
consequently eschew providing percentage breakdowns of our data, 
drawing on them instead for qualitative descriptions of the behaviour 
patterns we find. 
 
Additional interviews were conducted with 34 paid full-time trade 
union officials located in national and regional trade union offices, 
and 15 industry association officials, most of whom operated in the 
same industry sectors as the case study organisations. Particular value 
was attached to talking to all three sets of interviewees (employers, 
trade unions, and industry associations) during the period in which 
they might be planning for the new legislation, in order to assess what 
motivated their response, if any, to the new law. It was felt the period 
during which a response was under active consideration would reveal 
more about salient factors, and about possible pre-emptive action, than 
when legislation was either a vague prospect, or a fait accompli. 
 
Data were collected from interviewees relating to employer/trade 
union relationships and partnership arrangements, and responses in  
anticipation of the statutory recognition provisions in the ERA 1999. 
Employer representatives were also questioned extensively about the 
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nature and characteristics of their consultative, communication, and 
pay-setting arrangements, and recognition agreements. With the 
exception of three ‘sweatshops’, where circumstances were 
constrained, interviews were formal and structured around a 
questionnaire. Most were tape-recorded and fully transcribed. 
Interview data were inputted into a spreadsheet of results to form a 
matrix of responses that was analysed thematically.  
 
We start by considering the direct responses of, first, trade unions and, 
second, employers to the approach and arrival of the ERA. We then 
broaden the discussion by reporting on how the nature of collective 
bargaining in particular, and of employer/trade union relationships 
more generally, are changing. After an account of emerging patterns 
of joint consultation, we make a tentative assessment of the initial 
impact of the ERA. 
 
 
3. Trade union responses to the ERA 
  
The prospect of the ERA was taken very seriously by trade union 
officers. Most had stepped up planning of recognition targets, 
including mapping levels of unionisation across localities and within 
companies to assess recognition potential. This was often coupled 
with national or geographically based recognition campaigns. Unions 
were focusing efforts on sites with union members and no recognition 
agreement, on companies where they had been derecognised but 
retained high levels of membership, and on firms with recognition 
covering some part of the company or workforce but not the whole. In 
general, workplaces with either existing recognition agreements, or 
union members, were more likely to be targeted than non-union sites 
without agreements.  
 
All trade union interviewees expressed concerns about the costs and 
time that were involved in running campaigns to organise greenfield 
sites from scratch. Those unions which used a broad range of 
organising model methods and employed TUC Organising Academy 
trainees and graduates were more likely to allocate resources to  
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targeting new non-union areas for recruitment and recognition. It was 
evident, as Heery and his colleagues also found (2001), that TUC 
Organising Academy unions were more likely to target greenfield 
sites, and that unions which used a greater range of organising 
methods were more likely to encounter a hostile response. Not only 
are ‘organising’ unions more likely to encounter a hostile response 
because they target anti-union employers, but also employers, when 
confronted with ‘adversarial’ organising campaigns, appear to respond 
in a hostile manner.  
 
Most unions were preparing for the legislation by trying to build 
membership levels up to 50 per cent of all employees. There was more 
evidence of unions recruiting members prior to seeking recognition 
than vice versa, and thus building a position of strength rather than 
“organising the employer”. Other studies report similar findings (Gall 
& McKay 2000, TUC 2001, Wood et al 2001). High initial levels of 
membership were felt to be important because there was considerable 
variation in the warmth or hostility of employer responses to 
recognition requests.  
 
Towers (1999:85) reports that union leaders are placing emphasis 
upon making the recognition procedure work, perhaps because of 
evidence that more aggressive American organising model methods 
had proven ineffective. He warned that the procedures should not 
provide a substitute for organising. However, it seems that the two are 
going hand in hand, with trade unions first building majority 
membership and then seeking recognition. A key issue then is whether 
they are simply recruiting members, or ‘organising’ them in the sense 
of building effective self-sustaining workplace structures.  In the 
former there is a chance that membership will attenuate and union 
strength will dissipate once a recognition agreement has been 
achieved.  
 
Other aspects of the 1999 Act have brought about a changed role for 
trade unions. The continued rise in the range of individual statutory 
rights for their members, and the potentially substantial significance of 
the ‘right to be accompanied’ in individual disciplinary and grievance 
cases which the 1999 Act has provided, have combined to place what  
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may become unmanageable burdens on trade union full-time officials. 
The majority of officials saw the new rights as a double-edged sword. 
On the positive side, they were optimistic that the new 
accompaniment rights would bring opportunities and provide levers to 
build membership and recognition in hitherto non-union areas. For 
employers who wished to deal with only one union - if they had to 
deal with one at all - the accompaniment rights brought the threat of 
multi-unionisation. Some union officials attempted to capitalize on 
this by warning that unless their own union was given sole rights, 
employers might be faced with a multiplicity of unions.  
 
There was, on the negative side, widespread concern that unions 
would be deluged with calls for help from individual members, and 
would be unable to respond due to a lack of resources. Officials 
acknowledged that strong lay representative structures were necessary 
if they were to take advantage of the recruitment opportunities 
presented by the new rights. They expected their already onerous 
individual workloads to increase once the new provisions came into 
force. Some suggested that this would encourage greater devolution of 
representation in discipline and grievance cases to workplace union 
representatives. Indeed, some unions are developing a new style of lay 
activist to deal with accompaniment, not so much a bargainer with 
management over collective rights as a ‘bare-foot doctor’ dealing with 
members’ individual rights. Otherwise, if the accompaniment 
provisions are to enhance recruitment in the longer term, union 
officials will need to ‘collectivise’ complaints and organise collectives 
of workers around commonly-shared individual grievances rather than 
accompanying members on a case-by-case basis. As Wood & Godard 
note (1999:229), the new right offers a form of ‘partial recognition’ in 
all workplaces.
3 But it remains to be seen how far unions will be able 





4. Employer response to the ERA 
  
What impact did employers expect the ERA to have on employment 
relations practice? Most managers who expected changes in their 
organisations as a result of the Act believed that its recognition  
provisions would be the sole cause of such changes. They felt that 
changes to other provisions relating to union involvement – such as 
accompaniment in discipline and grievance cases, strike ballots, 
dismissal of strikers, blacklists, and discrimination against union 
members and activists - would have virtually no impact.  
 
There were sectoral differences. Service sector employer associations 
anticipated little impact of the statutory recognition procedures on 
their members. By contrast, production sector bodies expected 
substantial effects and emphasised the potential for disagreements 
relating to the boundaries of the bargaining unit. It was the 
accompaniment provisions that the service sector employers’ bodies 
felt were more likely to have an effect in their sectors. Interviewees in 
several of our service sector firms also anticipated that unions would 
use the accompaniment provisions ‘to get a foot in the door’. Some 
were contemplating extending an existing ‘shallow’ recognition 
agreement covering a small proportion of the workforce to all 
employees, in order to prevent a multiplicity of ‘new’ unions from 
representing employees. Employers were opposed to multi-
unionisation more generally, with some reducing the number of 
unions by, for example, derecognising minority-membership unions.  
 
Employers were responding to the new law in strategic and pragmatic 
ways. There was a high level of management knowledge and 
awareness of the various provisions of the ERA, and considerable 
evidence of planning in anticipation of the new law. Almost one-half 
of all employers eligible expected that the statutory recognition 
provisions would have an impact on them. Indeed, they were mostly 
being targeted for recognition by trade unions. Most were already 
partially unionised but without recognition agreements, or had only 
partial recognition coverage, circumstances consistent with union 
targets reported earlier. They were located across a broad range of 
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production and service sectors, and comprised both small and large 
organisations.  
 
Three main employer responses were evident in those firms where the 
statutory recognition provisions were expected to have an impact. 
About half of them – a mix of small and large, mainly production  
sector employers - were examining strategies for resisting recognition 
attempts. These included stalling by waiting for the Act to be passed 
before they responded to requests for recognition; upgrading terms 
and conditions of employment so as to reduce the potential attractions 
of trade unionism; setting up consultative arrangements, again as pre-
emptive devices; and manipulating potential bargaining units so as to 
prevent unions winning ballots. Moreover, a sizeable group of 
interviewees who did not think that statutory recognition would have 
an impact on them also remarked that they, too, planned to reshape 
their bargaining units if approached for recognition. There was much 
concern amongst trade union officials regarding the potential for 
employers to contest definitions of the bargaining unit. Most of these 
tactics were being recommended to some extent by employer 
association officials.  
 
Among these resisters of recognition, senior management attitudes 
were crucial. Three quarters of firms resisting were doing so not 
because they were institutionally anti-union, but simply because 
individual senior executives - managing directors, chairmen, owners, 
senior managers or board members - opposed recognition, in many 
cases despite advice to the contrary from HR staff. In only a minority 
of cases was the HR or personnel manager opposed to recognition. 
This suggests that such resistance might prove quite fragile. 
 
The remainder of those employers who expected recognition 
procedures to have an impact were evenly split into two groups. The 
first ‘non-resisting’ group comprised those who were resigned to 
recognition and were not planning to obstruct union efforts. Their 
response was relatively passive, although in most cases they were 
using the new procedures as an impetus for rationalising existing 
multi-union recognition arrangements.  
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Employers in the second ‘non-resisting’ group had adopted a more 
active strategy of managing the recognition process by attempting to 
manipulate the choice of union and bargaining unit to achieve an 
optimal outcome for their company. A number stated that they were 
willing to concede recognition on their own terms, which generally 
meant minimising the impact of recognition on the business by  
marginalising union activity. Some talked of ‘choosing’ a particular 
union or official to negotiate with whom they believed could be easily 
managed or advantageous to the company. These firms were mainly in 
the manufacturing sectors, and most had been targeted for recognition 
by several different unions. All but one could be considered to be, in 
most other respects, ‘pro-union’ employers. Managers in several of 
these firms were contemplating choosing, or had recently attempted to 
choose, a ‘soft’ union or official in order to exclude others whom they 
believed would be ‘more trouble’.  
 
Likewise, many union officials described how employers were 
approaching them to ward off other unions, and some officials had 
tailored their recognition appeals to take advantage of this 
nervousness among employers. Nearly all trade union interviewees 
described how, when approaching certain employers for recognition, 
they ‘warned’ them that if they neglected to conclude a deal with their 
particular union, they might subsequently be compelled to sign an 
agreement with another less desirable or appropriate union. This was a 
particularly pertinent threat given that employees can now choose any 
union to accompany them in serious grievance and disciplinary cases,
4 




5. The recognition process 
 
It was common for several unions to target the same company. One 
senior official likened the environment to the ‘wild west’ as unions 
rode out and staked recognition claims in companies. Consistent with 
our employer interviews, it was reported that those union officials 
prepared to use more confrontational organising methods – such as 
factory-gate leafleting – usually came off worse where there was inter-
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union competition, while those perceived by employers as ‘soft’ often 
benefited from employer choice. Union officials were aware of the 
dilemma this presented; some expressed doubts that organisation on 
sites where an employer had done a sweetheart deal with a union 
would remain robust.  
 
 
The considerable scope for inter-union disputes - particularly in the 
local government sector - was of concern to many officials. Some 
officials had developed agreements with competing unions to prevent 
such disputes, but senior officials argued that the TUC should play a 
greater role in adjudicating these disputes, as they were distracting 
unions from the key task at hand, that of organising the unorganised.  
 
Almost all union officials and employers who felt that the recognition 
procedures would have an impact thought that recognition would 
come about through voluntary recognition procedures. Voluntary 
agreements were preferred by both parties because they allowed them 
to manage the process rather than have an agreement imposed upon 
them. Only a small minority (two of each) contemplated going down 
the statutory recognition route likely to involve  formal, supervised 
balloting, in the first instance. About half of officials stated, however, 
that if efforts to gain recognition through voluntary procedures failed 
– for example, when faced with an obstructive employer - they would 
then use the legal route as a backstop.  
 
Individual trade unions and the TUC were proceeding cautiously, 
restricting and monitoring which applications would go to the CAC as 
the first test cases, in order to improve their chances of winning a 
ballot if that could not be avoided. Several larger unions set up 
internal clearing-house procedures to vet cases going to ballot and 
determine which would be the most likely to win, as the first cases 
taken. They did not want to establish poor case law, or for the first test 
case to be ‘a Grunwick’ which resulted in a legal ruling hostile to the 
prospects for recognition.
5 Moreover, several felt that a voluntary 
agreement, willingly entered into, was more likely to last and lead to 
more harmonious, stable employer-union relationships.  
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The experience of ACAS supports this picture. There has been a 
substantial upswing, dating from well before the Act actually came 
into effect, in the number of disputes concerning recognition in which 
ACAS conciliators have been involved. The number rose from around 
a hundred per year in the earlier 1990s to 384 in 2000-01 (ACAS, 
2001). But, since the full weight of the law has come into effect, only 
a tiny proportion of these have gone on to use that weight in the CAC  
– of 57 that had been applied for, 27 had been accepted and 14 
reached the balloting stage in the first ten months (CAC, 2001). 
Furthermore, the percentage of ACAS recognition conciliations that 
have been resolved in favour of the trade union (as opposed to the 
employer) has increased substantially – from 37 per cent in 1999-2000 
to 66 per cent in 2000-01 - as has the rate of success in achieving 
recognition agreements (ACAS, 2001). To this should be added 
reports from trade union officers of many recognition agreements 
having been reached informally without the involvement of ACAS or 
the CAC. In short, the prospect and later the presence of the new law 
has encouraged the formation of voluntary recognition settlements 
with little actual recourse to its legal procedures.  
 
 
6. Changing employer-trade union relationships 
 
So much for the direct response of employers and trade unions to the 
mechanics of the new legislation. But to concentrate on this would be 
to neglect the more diffuse, demonstrative effect that much social 
legislation has, and its symbolic role in asserting new officially 
approved standards of behaviour. How far is the ERA, with its stated 
commitment to encouraging ‘workplace partnerships’, reasserting and 
reshaping the acceptability of collective bargaining?  
 
Managers and union officials spoke repeatedly of a change in 
“climate” or “atmosphere”. Trade union officials believed that 
employers were more receptive to union involvement than in the past. 
This was due to a combination of factors, including the election of a 
Labour government, new labour laws, and - as also reported by Gall & 
McKay (2000) and TUC (2000) - opportunistic motivations, as some 
private service sector employers viewed union agreements as an 
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advantage in winning future public sector contracts. Many managers, 
too, felt that unions were becoming more “business-focused” and 
“useful” to employers.  
 
Such changes in attitude might suggest that a convergence of interests 
has occurred, spurred by both legal changes and competitive 
pressures. But this convergence is not universal. Consistent with our 
research method of choosing enterprises that displayed a range of  
attitudes towards trade unions, almost half of the managers 
interviewed expressed anti-union views and actively pursued a variety 
of union-avoidance strategies. And most trade union interviewees 
stated that they experienced a range of employer behaviour, from 
positive to fiercely anti-union. 
 
However, where recognition agreements did exist, managers reported 
union-employer relationships to be very positive. To be more precise, 
managers described their dealings with full-time union officials as 
universally constructive, but their relationships with stewards and 
other lay representatives were not as consistently cooperative, 
although the majority still reported positive dealings with them. Many 
employers preferred to deal mainly with national-level union officials, 
whom they believed to be more moderate and sympathetic to business 
needs or whom they felt had a degree of strategic oversight that was 
lacking among local union officials or lay representatives. Moreover, 
local officials and workplace representatives were described as more 
likely to obstruct or resist management of change initiatives. 
Accordingly, several managers bypassed or refused to deal with more 
‘troublesome’ union officials, while others used strategies aimed at 
co-opting representatives. 
 
Of those managers who had contact with trade unions, all but one 
stated that over the past five years their relationships with unions had 
remained consistently good or had improved. In many cases this was 
due to a change of senior management or HR staff, or because 
companies had actively sought union involvement in organisational 
change processes. Around one-fifth of the firms in our study - some 
with anti-union pasts, and most with newly-recruited HR executives – 
had recently built positive relationships with trade unions in order to 
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seek their assistance in implementing organisational change 
programmes necessitated by competitive pressures. There are grounds 
for predicting that many firms currently hostile to trade unions may 
swing over to union acceptance quite quickly. As has been noted, 
hostility to unions is often confined to the owner or chief executive, 
and improved relations with trade unions often coincided with the 
appointment of new senior or HR managers. Some firms that had 
traditionally had little involvement with trade unions had anticipated  
the coming legislative changes and had recruited new HR staff with 
extensive experience of working with unions. For these firms the 
demonstrative impact of the ERA was very evident. 
The partnership arrangements that were in evidence in eleven of our 
case study firms covered a wide spectrum. This ranged at one end 
from closely collaborative arrangements, referred to by employers as 
‘partnership relationships’ in which management sought to manage an 
existing cooperative, informal relationship with the union proactively 
and positively, encouraging it to grow. At the other end, employers 
who were more concerned with restricting the union role than with 
cultivating it had negotiated formalised partnership agreements. 
Indeed, the more formal the agreement, the more likely it appeared to 
be concerned with setting clear boundaries to union influence 
(Oxenbridge and Brown, 2001). In general, union rights were greater 
in those companies that had informal partnership relationships than 
they were in those companies that had formal partnership agreements 
with unions. 
 
7. The coverage and scope of recognition 
  
Does this observation that closer working relationships have recently 
been developing between employers and trade unions imply that they 
may be returning to a style of collective bargaining comparable to that 
of twenty years earlier? In order to address this we consider in more 
detail the recognition agreements that were in operation at 40 per cent 
of the firms in our study. We take in turn the extent of their coverage, 




The recognition agreements were far from comprehensive in 
coverage. In half of all firms with agreements they covered only a 
minority of employees. In almost all of these cases, this was because 
minority groups of unionised employees had been transferred into 
companies as a result of acquisitions or public sector contracting 
processes. Indeed, in almost half of all firms with recognition, the 
recognition status had been transferred into the enterprise along with 
unionised groups of workers. Most commonly public sector workers 
had been transferred into private sector organisations as a result of  
outsourcing in sectors such as IT, nursing homes, NHS ancillary 
services, and temporary employment.  
 
 
This is an important incidental side-effect of legislation with a quite 
different objective. As a result of privatisation and outsourcing, the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 
1981 (TUPE) has brought together the contrasting employment 
relations practice and cultures of the unionised public sector and the 
non-union private sector. This has encouraged hitherto non-unionised 
organisations to recruit managers with experience in unionised sectors 
to manage newly acquired unionised workforces, or to train existing 
managers in how to manage these employees. Transfers have also 
resulted in multiple sets of terms and conditions, and often in distinct 
sets of consultation and communication structures. This has produced 
a mixture of union committees on unionised sites, and non-union 
committees or management-dominated communication processes 
elsewhere (or in addition). Since transferred recognition agreements 
usually apply to a minority of employees within much larger 
organisations, there is considerable scope for unions to extend both 
membership and recognition coverage throughout the broader 
organisation. Indeed, in the majority of our case study firms into 
which recognition agreements had been transferred, the unions party 
to the agreements were using these recognised groups as a springboard 
for extending recognition throughout the wider, largely non-union 
organisation. In most cases this had met with employer opposition.  
 
Just as the proportion of the workforce affected by recognition 
agreements is often restricted, so also is the scope of issues for which 
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rights are recognised. Our cases with union recognition could be 
divided into two groups. One-third of cases - mainly service sector 
employers with low union density - had ‘shallow’ agreements that 
mainly provided for consultation over a limited number of issues, or 
provided only for union representation of individuals.
6 In only three of 
the firms in this group were unions recognised for negotiating pay, 
and in one of these, union influence over pay levels was described as 
‘very limited’. The other two-thirds of cases with recognition had 
apparently comprehensive agreements that ostensibly allowed for 
negotiation with unions over most of the following items: pay, non-
pay terms and conditions of employment, health and safety, pensions,  
training, termination and suspension of employment, and union 
representation in grievance and discipline cases. TUC data suggest 
that 94 per cent of the estimated 159 new recognition agreements 
negotiated during 2000 allowed for this sort of comprehensive 
recognition (TUC, 2001). 
 
This, however, is misleading for in fewer than half of our firms in 
which recognition ostensibly covered pay – which was only one-tenth 
of  all cases – was pay actually negotiated at the workplace or 
company level for the majority of employees. For the remainder, what 
pay negotiations there were only affected a minority of the workforce, 
or the employer followed national industrial agreements or, the 
employer did no more than consult with employee representatives on 
pay.  In most case study organisations – around two-thirds - we found 
that pay increases for the main group of employees were set wholly by 
managers, without any consultation or negotiation with employee 
representatives of any description. Although the samples are not 
directly comparable, these results are consistent with the 
representative picture provided by WERS98 (Brown et al, 2000).  
 
This exclusion of union influence from pay was reinforced by the 
choice of pay system. Half of our cases used individual performance-
related pay (PRP) schemes, with two-thirds of these using PRP to set 
pay for the majority of employees. Many firms in the finance, retail 
and IT sectors had introduced such schemes recently, or were 
planning to do so soon. Many firms also planned to introduce team 
bonuses in coming years. As other studies have found, our cases 
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suggest it is very unusual for trade unions to be involved in the 
administration of these largely appraisal-based PRP schemes (for 
example Gunnigle et al, 1998, Brown et al, 1998). 
 
In summary, the scope of bargaining in those cases where unions had 
recognition agreements was narrow and their impact was limited. We 
found no evidence to suggest that the arrival of the ERA would alter 
this. Union recognition has become a diffuse and often shallow status 
(Brown et al, 2001). On the one hand, where trade unions are not 
formally recognised, rights to individual representation are generally 
widespread. But, on the other hand, where trade unions are 
recognised, they have very limited influence over pay, which is 
perhaps the most fundamental issue for collective bargaining. This is a 
finding consistent with WERS98 (Brown et al, 2000). It suggests that 
a fundamental change has occurred in the character of collective 
bargaining. Whether it is irreversible is another matter.  
 
8. Consultative structures 
 
A fundamental change appears to have occurred in the character of 
collective bargaining and our cases did not suggest that the ERA will 
moderate this. But what of the wider aspects of collective 
representation? What has happened to collective consultation? Writing 
at a time when workplace bargaining was in the ascendant, McCarthy 
concluded that ‘in general…it appears that joint consultative 
committees are only able to retain a primary place in the workplace 
system of labour relations where unionisation and shop steward 
representation is non-existent or weak’ (McCarthy, 1967: 34). Might 
the decline workplace bargaining lead to the restoration of collective 
consultation to this ‘primary place’? 
 
A slight majority of the firms we studied had stable, regular 
consultative committees, works councils, or some other consultative 
body. Half of the non-union firms had them. Particularly  notable is 
that just under half of our cases with workplace consultative 
committees had established them in the last four years. Furthermore, a 
substantial minority were planning to establish new committees, or to 
make existing procedures more structured, in the near future. Five 
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employers were planning or making changes because they anticipated 
that negotiation of a new recognition agreement as a direct impact of 
the ERA would necessitate the establishment of a new consultative 
structure, or would lead to union representatives having more 
involvement in existing, more formalised structures. Nine of our case 
study firms had recently, or were about to, set up consultative 
structures to comply with the European Works Council or Draft 
Information and Consultation Directives. We might expect more 
activity of this nature, now that a version of the latter Directive has 




Other managers who planned to make changes to consultative 
structures intended to extend committees from a minority of sites to 
all sites, or to increase the extent of consultation with employees 
within existing structures. Those in the latter group expressed a desire 
to expand the role of committees or councils by increasing the volume 
and range of issues discussed by these bodies. In most cases, they 
anticipated that this would come about as a result of a change in 
management style and priorities, or by management implementing 
specific initiatives to bolster consultative structures.  
 
Many employers were planning substantial changes to committees to 
increase their role in change management processes. They reported 
that the issues most commonly discussed by existing consultative 
committees related to organisational change, including the 
implementation of restructuring, redundancy and short-time working 
programmes, and the harmonisation of terms and conditions following 
company mergers and acquisitions and the transfer of workers after 
winning outsourcing contracts. Committees that discussed these issues 
tended to be dominated by union members or officials and to be in 
firms with recognition agreements.  
 
Change management issues were at the forefront in most of the firms 
and establishments studied. For example, over three-quarters of our 
cases had made some employees redundant in the five years preceding 
the interviews, with most doing so recently. Most of these firms had 
restructured working hours and shift patterns during this period, and 
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one-third of firms had been involved in mergers or acquisitions 
recently, with many expecting further activity in the near future.  
 
When asked for an example of a significant recent issue over which 
they had consulted employees, most managers from firms without 
consultative structures stated that they too had consulted over similar 
issues related to change such as redundancies, reorganisation after 
taking on new brands, and introducing annualised hours. The growth 
of consultation over such issues may offer an explanation as to why 
many employers were planning new, formal committees.  
 
 
Tempering this, however, several managers mentioned that workers 
were increasingly reluctant to take on the role of worker representative 
because they did not want to deal with issues of organisational change, 
particularly implementing redundancy and short-time working 
programmes. This, and the fact that union members often resist 
changes, may explain why some employers are keen to involve full-
time union officials in change processes instead. Increasingly, HR 
staff were using committees to generate ideas for increasing output 
and profits. In one-third of firms with consultative structures, 
committees discussed ‘business’ issues related to improving product 
quality, performance, customer service and sales. We might conclude 
that many committees have very little effective power, with 
information flowing in one direction, except where managers feel that 
committees can be a useful means of generating profit-making ideas. 
 
Slightly over half of firms with consultative committees of some sort 
had recognition agreements, and a similar proportion had councils or 
committees in which most or all employee representatives were union 
members. Many employers referred to the benefits of union 
communication and consultation structures in terms of persuading 
employees of the need for change, and the reduced transaction costs of 
dealing with one channel in change processes. However, at the same 
time, some were actively endeavouring to reduce union control over 
structures in order to shift employee loyalty towards the company and 
to increase the involvement of non-union employees. Most union 
officials stated that this was a common management strategy for 
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weakening union influence. Some managers had established, or 
planned to develop, dual union and non-union structures or 
committees. These typically took the form of committees comprising 
representative quotas of union and non-union representatives, or 
steward committees operating alongside more diffuse and influential 
management-controlled communication channels, such as team briefs 
and focus groups.  
 
It appears that both the new EC directives and the accelerated pace of 
change within organisations have resulted in greater management 
consultation and communication with the workforce, through more 
formalised structures. The prospect of recognition and future EC  
legislation is leading to greater union involvement in some firms, 
while in others employers are actively restricting union participation 
in consultative structures. We might conclude that although the ERA 
legislation was concerned principally with union recognition rather 
than with the development of consultative arrangements, it has 
certainly not hindered the growth of consultation. Indeed, in many 
firms it has acted as a catalyst for the formalisation of existing 





The attribution of behavioural change to legal innovation is never 
straightforward. The success of any legislation depends to a large 
extent on how far it goes with the grain of underlying societal changes 
and thereby steers, rather than forces, the process of adjustment. What 
can be said, at this relatively early stage, of the impact of the ERA 
upon collective representation in British employment? 
 
Our interviews indicate widespread agreement among employers and 
union officials that the ERA has made a major contribution to 
achieving a change in both the atmosphere and conduct of 
employment relations. There can be no doubt that there has been a 
strong symbolic impact. Trade unions have regained official tolerance, 
if not encouragement, and they are experiencing a more sympathetic 
response from employers. Employers for their part have responded 
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with their characteristic pragmatism, as evidenced by their recruiting 
managers with experience of dealing with unions.  
 
Whether or not individual employers have welcomed the ERA, most 
of those who do not already fully recognise trade unions have become 
aware of its statutory recognition procedures and have responded to 
them. Some have been prompted to strengthen their anti-union 
employment strategies, but many have taken the opportunity to review 
their policy towards trade unions. They have redefined the basis of 
their recognition of unions, including the scope of bargaining and of 
consultation, the pattern of bargaining units, and the structure of 
representation. Many have taken the opportunity to reconsider which 
unions they choose to deal with, gratuitously assisted in this by the  
readiness of unions to compete with each other. But although the 
nature of collective bargaining has been changing, with growing 
constraints on bargaining over pay, these constraints cannot be 
attributed to the ERA. The conclusion is rather that the ERA has had 
the effect of speeding up a process of managed trade union 
recognition, re-recognition or (in some workplaces) exclusion that had 
already got well under way during the 1990s. 
 
It is not only employers who have been forced to make choices. 
Within trade unions, as Gall & McKay (2000:5) note, the ERA has 
‘engendered a sense of urgency and a concentration of minds’. But it 
has not simply accelerated developments that would have occurred 
anyway. More positively, the ERA - along with EU influenced 
legislative changes - has had a substantial effect in shifting the balance 
of employer attitudes towards greater approval of trade unions. 
Although employers are tending to restrict unions’ influence over 
traditional issues such as pay-setting, they are increasingly seeking 
their assistance in implementing difficult organisational changes. 
Their appetite for workplace partnership reflects this, albeit on terms 
largely dictated by employers. A key question for trade unions is 
whether, where managers have embraced them as partners in change, 
they can build membership, and exert greater influence over the 
employment relationship across a broader range of issues.  
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In one major respect - the provision of employees with information 
and consultation rights - the ERA failed to go with the grain of 
contemporary developments in employment relations.  In choosing 
instead to focus on recognition rights, it risked an unwelcome return to 
adversarial industrial relations. But in practice, it has not impeded the 
continuing growth of the consultation model. Indeed, adjustment to 
the ERA appears to have been accompanied by a surge in consultative 
activity, sometimes to pre-empt recognition, sometimes to structure it, 
and sometimes simply because employers could see the direction in 
which the legislative wind is blowing from Europe. The acceptance of 
the Draft Directive can be expected to accelerate and to shape further 
developments in consultative arrangements, and to establish them as a 
central feature of collective representation in Britain. Of particular 
importance to trade unions may be opportunity that the provision of  
consultative rights will offer them to establish a presence in the large 
tracts of employment where at present they have no members. Their 
success in this will depend upon how far they can persuade both 
unorganized workers and non-union employers that the presence of an 
independent trade union can enhance the consultative process. 
 
Thus collective representation of employees is expanding once again. 
It is true that this does not, on the whole, take the form of traditional 
collective bargaining, but rather of consultative and representational 
arrangements which are less dependent than in the past upon the 
potential for collective worker action. The 1999 Act and the drift of 
EU influence have accelerated the rate at which employers are 
redesigning their relationships with unions. But if employer attitudes 
are changing, a note of caution should be sounded so far as the unions 
are concerned. Consultation arrangements can be seen as co-opting 
unions into managing processes of organisational change. While this 
potentially expands the role of unions in the workplace, it can also 
come into conflict with their task of representing the rights and 
interests of workers in the face of employer pressure. If unions find 
that they can only win employer acceptance by conceding influence 
over key issues such as pay, communication with the workforce, and 
the conduct of work, the greater the likelihood that they will lose 
grass-roots appeal and the enthusiasm of the lay activists on whose 




1      For an account of the new law which places it in the context of      
developments in the practice of union recognition, see Brown et 
al., 2001. 
 
2    Political agreement on a text of a proposal for a Directive 
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting 
employees in the European Community was reached in the 
Council of Ministers on 11 June 2001. The text will now be 
considered (and may be amended) by the European Parliament. 
The current text grants member states of the EU five years from 
the date of the Directive’s adoption to bring their laws into line 
with its provisions. On the legal significance of the 
‘consultation’ model as distinct from approaches based on union 
recognition, see Brown et al., 2001. 
 
3    Granting individuals the right to be accompanied by a union 
official of their choice does not, as such, confer legal 
‘recognition’ rights upon unions, for the reasons discussed by 
Brown  et al., 2001; however, as indicated in the text, the 
accompaniment provisions are having a significant practical 
effect in terms of enhancing union presence on the ground. 
 
4      Recognition of one union does not prevent an individual invoking 
the right to be accompanied by an official of another, but both 
unions and employers appear to have acted on the assumption 
that recognition would diminish the practical value of such a 
step from the point of view of the individual, and 
correspondingly help the employer to reduce the costs of dealing 
with multiple unions. 
 
5     On the Grunwick case and other decisions which restricted the 
statutory powers of ACAS under the recognition laws of the 




6   It is unclear whether these agreements would amount to 
‘recognition’ in the legal sense of that term, which normally 
implies that the employer agrees to negotiate with the union and 
not simply to consult with it.  For analysis of the different legal 
definitions of recognition currently in force and their 
relationship to the practice of recognition, see Brown et al., 
2001. 
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1  For an account of the new law which places it in the context of developments in the practice of 
union recognition, see Brown et al., 2001. 
 
2  Political agreement on a text of a proposal for a Directive establishing a general framework for 
informing and consulting employees in the European Community was reached in the Council of 
Ministers on 11 June 2001. The text will now be considered (and may be amended) by the European 
Parliament. The current text grants member states of the EU five years from the date of the Directive’s 
adoption to bring their laws into line with its provisions. On the legal significance of the ‘consultation’ 
model as distinct from approaches based on union recognition, see Brown et al., 2001. 
 
3   Granting individuals the right to be accompanied by a union official of their choice does not, as 
such, confer legal ‘recognition’ rights upon unions, for the reasons discussed by Brown et al., 2001; 
however, as indicated in the text, the accompaniment provisions are having a significant practical 
effect in terms of enhancing union presence on the ground. 
 
4  Recognition of one union does not prevent an individual invoking the right to be accompanied by an 
official of another, but both unions and employers appear to have acted on the assumption that 
recognition would diminish the practical value of such a step from the point of view of the individual, 
and correspondingly help the employer to reduce the costs of dealing with multiple unions. 
 
5  On the Grunwick case and other decisions which restricted the statutory powers of ACAS under the 
recognition laws of the 1970s, see Simpson, 1979. 
 
6  It is unclear whether these agreements would amount to ‘recognition’ in the legal sense of that term, 
which normally implies that the employer agrees to negotiate with the union and not simply to consult 
with it.  For analysis of the different legal definitions of recognition currently in force and their 
relationship to the practice of recognition, see Brown et al., 2001. 
 
7  See note 2, above. 